Robert Fisks-Half Baked Analysis of Afghanistan-Faux Pas of US and British Policy-click on foto to enlarge

CLICK ON FOTO TO ENLARGE




CIA OFFICER HAS LUNCH WITH TWO MEN NOW THEY CONDEMN AS TERRORISTS , HEKMATYAR AND KHALIS



IN FORWARD LOCATION WITH THEN ISI BOSS OVERSEEING OPERATIONS HOW TO DESTROY BRIDGES IN AFGHANISTAN,ELECTRIC LINES AND HOW TO SET UP BOMBS IN STUDENTS CAFETERIA OF KABUL UNIVERSITY

Robert Fisk writes well and what he writes is good stuff for readers who do not know the history.However there are many loopholes in his analysis.

1-In 1840 it was not Britain which invaded Afghanistan but the very private English East India Company ,the vast bulk of this force being the private native army of the company and some British regiments on hire from the British government.The much magnified and exaggerated British diasaster was actually a weak and famished brigade withdrawing from Kabul to Jalalabad consisting of much starved and famished and ill clad about 700 Brits from HM 44th Foot and some 5000 Indian troops of the English Companys private army , all far outnumbered by some 15,000 to 25,000 Afghans.

Now there are important differences in the Soviet and American attacks.The Soviet came to assist an ally which was Afghanistans de facto government.The USA displaced and removed a defacto government.

The Soviets had defined political objerctives.USA has ill defined and vague objectives.The Soviets were a homogenuous force.The USA is a coalition of disinterested allies less the British.

The anti Soviet resistance was massively financed by state and superpower actors while the Taliban resistance is financed by non state actors and possibly covertly by state actors.Thus the Soviets performed much better losing just 1,000 men per year while the Americans are dispersed,weak on ground and control an area far less than the Soviets.

The anti Soviet resistance was multi ethnic but the anti American resistance is solidly Pashtun.

The US supply lines have been generally far more secure than the Soviet supply lines with the exception of some isolated occurrences in the last two months.

The Soviets were opposing insurgents supplied by the best weaponry including SAMs while the anti US forces have no such advanced weaponry.

Now when Fisk quotes Tanner and states that the British supply line in 1840 was from Karachi to Peshawar he is wrong with the facts.Because Tanner is wrong.The supply line of Englisj East India Company was initially Karachi via Quetta and Kandahar and later from Ferozpur to Peshawar and Kabul.

Another importan difference is that the East India Company succeeded in its political objectives i.e keeping the Russians out of Afghanistan and the British controlled Afghanistans foreign relations till 1919 and ensured that Afghanistan remained a docile neutral neighbour till 1947 , in the case of Americans , Afghanistan will be a more anti American and hostile place after the USA withdraws.

The complex situation that the USA is facing is far more different from that of USSR in Afghanistan.The USSR was fighting motivated mercenaries while the USA is fighting a far more complex organisation with global ideological roots.While there were two players in Afghanistan in 1979-88 i.e USSR and USA and its vassals ( Pakistan/Saudi Arabia) today Afghanistan has a more complex power equation.The north is heavily Russian and Iranian infiltrated with some Indian influence the south is chaotic and heavily radicalised.The cost of maintenance of US troops is much higher than the cost of manitenance of Soviet soldiers.The USA is relying on airpower and very weak on ground,while the Soviets were more vulnerable in aerial dimension and stronger on ground.

While Soviet withdrawal led to an internal civil war US withdrawal will lead to fresh entry into Afghanistan of many powers including Russia,Iran,India,China and Pakistan.

The English East India Company from 1842 till 1858 and the British crown from 1858 till 1947 with very nominal subsidies managed to control Afghanistan in the remote mode.The USA has spent billions and most of this money has gone in pockets of the few both US and Afghan business interests.

The British successfully controlled all Afghanistans neighbours and kept the Russians in check while USA has failed to control any of Afghanistans neighbouring countries who at the covert level are aiding anti US insurgents.

While the leftist regime lasted three and half years of Soviet withdrawal the Pro US Afghan regime will not last for more than a month after US withdrawal.

The gravest difference is that the USSR succeeded in winning many hearts and minds in Afghanistans north centre and all parts of the country.Further Afghanistan was no threat to USSR after it withdrew.Here in this case Afghanistan will remain a nursery of terrorists after US withdrawal and this threat will remain in force for many decaded to come.The US and British troops are hated in Afghanistan for their arrogance,bragging attitude,extreme reserve while the Afghans remember the Soviets as friendly , sharing their chocolates with Afghans and never wearing the bulky bullet proof jackets that the US and British wear.Bullet proof jackets that exude a sense of extreme fear ! The problem is that Rober Fisk has not studied the present Afghan situation in detail.The leftists of that time were men known for their honesty.Gulabozai who was Interior Minister for 10 years does not have a car even now.General Ulumi who was Parchami and corps commander Kandahar in leftist regime is still so popular that he got the second highest number of votes from Kandahar province in 2005 despite all the rigging done by Karzais brother.General Gulabozai got the highest number of votes from Khost Province in 2005 elections.Actually most old Khalqis are now Talibs or in Hekmatyar party.Mulla Borjan main initial leader of Taliban and murdered by agents of Afghanistans neighbouring int agencies was a Khalqi leftist officer for many years and was trained at the Harbi Pohntoon Kabul.

Its incorrect to compare what the Brits did in Afghanistan with the Americans.The British policy was successfull in the final analysis while American policy has been a phenomenal failure so far .

The tragedy and grand irony of the whole situation is the fact that both USA (manipulated by a Polish Brezinski who had a vested interest and biased mindset and succeeded in manipulating a naieve peanut farmer) and Britain were in forefront in financing the anti Soviet insurgents.


------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





Kabul 30 Years Ago, and Kabul Today. Have We Learned Nothing?
'Terrorists' were in Soviet sights; now they are in the Americans'.
by Robert Fisk

I sit on the rooftop of the old Central Hotel - pharaonic-decorated elevator, unspeakable apple juice, sublime green tea, and armed Tajik guards at the front door - and look out across the smoky red of the Kabul evening. The Bala Hissar fort glows in the dusk, massive portals, the great keep to which the British army should have moved its men in 1841. Instead, they felt the king should live there and humbly built a cantonment on the undefended plain, thus leading to a "signal catastrophe".

Like automated birds, the kites swoop over the rooftops. Yes, the kite-runners of Kabul, minus Hollywood. At night, the thump of American Sikorsky helicopters and the whisper of high-altitude F-18s invade my room. The United States of America is settling George Bush's scores with the "terrorists" trying to overthrow Hamid Karzai's corrupt government.

Now rewind almost 29 years, and I am on the balcony of the Intercontinental Hotel on the other side of this great, cold, fuggy city. Impeccable staff, frozen Polish beer in the bar, s ecret policemen in the front lobby, Russian troops parked in the forecourt. The Bala Hissar fort glimmers through the smoke. The kites - green seems a favourite colour - move beyond the trees. At night, the thump of Hind choppers and the whisper of high-altitude MiGs invade my room. The Soviet Union is settling Leonid Brezhnev's scores with the "terrorists" trying to overthrow Barbrak Karmal's corrupt government.

Thirty miles north, all those years ago, a Soviet general told us of the imminent victory over the "terrorists" in the mountains, imperialist "remnants" - the phrase Kabul communist radio always used - who were being supported by America and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Fast forward to 2001 - just seven years ago - and an American general told us of the imminent victory over the "terrorists" in the mountains, the all but conquered Taliban who were being supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Russian was pontificating at the big Soviet airbase at Bagram. The American general was pontificating at the big US airbase at Bagram.

This is not déjà-vu. This is déjà double-vu. And it gets worse.

Almost 29 years ago, the Afghan "mujahedin" began a campaign to end the mixed schooling of boys and girls in the remote mountain passes, legislation pushed through by successive communist governments. Schools were burned down. Outside Jalalabad, I found a headmaster and his headmistress wife burned to death. Today, the Afghan Taliban are campaigning to end the mixed schooling of boys and girls - indeed the very education of young women - across the great deserts of Kandahar and Helmand. Schools have been burned down. Teachers have been executed.

As the Soviets began to suffer more and more casualties, their officers boasted of the increasing prowess of the Afghan National Army, the ANA. Infiltrated though they were by the "mujahedin", Moscow gave them newer tanks and helped to train new battalions to take on the guerrillas outside the capital.

Fast forward to now. As the Americans and British suffer ever greater casualties, their officers boast of the increasing prowess of the ANA. Infiltrated though they are by the Taliban, America and other Nato states are providing them with newer equipment and training new battalions to take on the guerrillas outside the capital. Back in January of 1980, I could take a bus from Kabul to Kandahar. Seven years later, the broken highway was haunted by "mujahedin" fighters and bandits and the only safe way to travel to Kandahar was by air.

In the immediate aftermath of America's arrival here in 2001, I could take a bus from Kabul to Kandahar. Now, seven years later, the highway - rebuilt on the express instructions of George W but already cracked and swamped with sand - is haunted by Taliban fighters and bandits and the only safe way to travel to Kandahar is by air.

Throughout the 1980s, the Soviets and the ANA held th e towns but lost most of the country. Today, America and its allies and the ANA hold most of the towns but have lost the southern half of the country. The Soviets secretly sent another 9,000 troops to join their 115,000-strong occupation force to fight the "mujahedin". Today, the Americans are publicly sending another 7,000 troops to join their 55,000-strong occupation force to fight the Taliban.

In 1980, I would sneak down to Chicken Street to buy old books in the dust-filled shops, cheap and illegal Pakistani reprints of the memoirs of British Empire officers while my driver watched anxiously lest I be mistaken for a Russian. Last week, I sneaked down to the Shar Book shop, which is filled with the very same illicit volumes, while my driver watched anxiously lest I be mistaken for an American (or, indeed, a Brit). I find Stephen Tanner's Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander The Great To The Fall Of The Taliban and drive back to my hotel through the streets of wood-smoked Kabul to read it in my ill-lit room.

In 1840, Tanner writes, Britain's supply line from the Pakistani city of Karachi up through the Khyber Pass and Jalalabad to Kabul was being threatened by Afghan fighters, "British officers on the crucial supply line through Peshawar... insulted and attacked". I fumble through my bag for a clipping from a recent copy of Le Monde. It marks Nato's main supply route from the Pakistani city of Karachi up through the Khyber Pass and Jalalabad to Kabul , and illustrates the location of each Taliban attack on the convoys bringing fuel and food to America's allies in Afghanistan.

Then I prowl through one of the Pakistani retread books I have found and discover General Roberts of Kandahar telling the British in 1880 that "we have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself... I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us, the less they will dislike us".

Memo to the Americans, the Brits, the Canadians and the rest of Humpty Dumpty's men. Read Roberts. Read history.
© 2008 Independent/UK