Dr Hamid Hussain on Pakistan Army Promotions

The publication of this piece does not mean that we agree with any of Dr Hamid Hussains assertion.My view is that he is discussing hopeless windbags barring may be 1 or 2 odd exceptions.A military system which is an undoubted failure.This includes the Indian Army also.Equally hopeless
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November 04, 2008

Dear All;

A fine and cerebral officer of Pakistan army has pointed to some factual mistakes in my piece which was circulated earlier (I think all of you got the piece few days ago. If not, it will be better to go to the bottom and read the piece first.) He has also given his perspective and is of the view that I was unfair in my assessment of some officers. I feel obliged to circulate his point of view and my response to everyone to be fair. This discussion has been limited only to Pakistan army officers both serving & retired.

Some of you I don't know personally and your e-mails may have become part of my address book when some of your acquaintances have sent those to me. If you do not wish to be on the list please drop me a line and I'll remove it from my list. If you wish to correct, comment and critique, you are welcome. Most important is correction of mistakes especially anything which I write. We have the right to our opinion but we do not have the right to manufacture our own facts. Please specify in your response whether you want your remarks to be limited to my education only or also shared with other officers on the list. Rules of the game are that name is not mentioned to keep focus on the subject (unfortunately in our culture, genuine difference of opinion is considered as personal insult, therefore many are hesitant to speak their mind.) I think it is right time to overcome that for a meaningful and informed dialogue. Sit back and enjoy the show.

Regards,
Hamid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CEREBERAL OFFR TO DR HAMID HUSSAIN


Dear Hamid Hussain,
Well your predictions turned out to be 95 % true but the reasons given are the other way around.Nusrat Naeem,Asif Akhtar and Mohsin Kamal are my course mates and i know their standing in the Army very well.Your remarks about Asif Akhtar are most unkind.He always stood out and is widely respected.In fact you may have misinterpretted the remarks of the person who knew him well.He must have meant that there are very little chances of a straight person like him being promoted rather than his ability to be promoted.He had commanded an Inf Div and did not need any further exposure.I think their supercession was part of the overhaul that ISI went through.Mohsin is posted as MS,one of the most prestigious positions in GHQ due health reasons.Mir Haider is stll in uniform doing as Addl Secy Defence.
I hope you will stand corrected on these issues
Regards
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HAMID HUSSAIN TO CEREBERAL OFFICER


My response;



'A freind is someone who tells you the truth; not someone who blieves in you'. King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz

November 02, 2008

Dear Brigadier .....;

Salaam

Thank you very much for your kind e-mail. Thanks for reading carefully my bipolar ramblings and pointing to some factual errors. I stand corrected. Mir Haider is still wearing the uniform and was prematurely retired by me. Pieces about inner workings of Pakistan army are only shared with few serving and retired officers on my list. They are not for publication. In my view such things do not serve any meaningful purpose to circulate to those who have no interest in the subject. In addition, so called free media sometimes runs away with a sentence or remark to take a cheap shot at army. This is not the purpose of this excercise.

I don't have any ulterior motive and always frank. I'm an American of Pakistani descent and therefore like a man with two wives; First one (Pakistan) which gave me succour in difficult and trying times, was faithful and took care of all my needs when I needed it most. When successful, I chose the second (U.S.) which was young, charming and now could be a suitable companion to hang around. I love both but you can understand the dilemma and make your own judgement. My focus is on areas of mutual interest of Pakistan and U.S.

I have no organizational affiliation and therefore can meet anyone without hesitation; Pakistani, U.S., Indian, Israelis etc. I dont have access to any classified information and many are kind enough to share their view as long as they remain anonymous. My information about military affairs is based on open sources and interviews with dozens of officers from different backgorunds and from the rank of Lt. to Lt. General. I'm guilty of connecting the dots based on my knowledge and I may be off the mark widely and always ready to correct myself. (This lengthy introduction was essential in view of both a conspiracy ridden world view of many and our interesting times of covert & psy. ops., extraordinary renditions, torture galore etc.)

As every one is well aware, in current 'interesting times' even routine change in pakistan army generates lot of interest all around the globe especially in washington where arrogance is matched only by the ignorance. This particular piece was written as conversation with a U.S. mid level officer who closely works with Pakistan (as some of you could guess from the format and language).

First of all lets clarify some basic points for meaningful understanding. I must admit that I have limited knowledge and there is always other side of the story. It is not humanly possible to look at all possible aspects of an officer's career and every perspective will be deficient in some regards. It should be remembered that my humble view is essentially of an outsider. One thing I can assure that I have no personal favorites or whipping boys among the officer corps. I may have my own biases therefore reader should be careful and make their own conclusion. On the other hand, in my book 'rank is nothing, talent is everything'. Frankly, I have no respect for a full colonel who decides to supervise the 'degs' at the wedding of the daughter of a general. He does not belong to the army and should go somehere else to earn his living. And the general who embarks on such absurdities needs condemnation.

In every army and pakistan army is no exception, every senior officer comes in contact with a large number of fellow officers in different capacities and they judge him according to the nature of their interaction. These are all subjective in nature. A colleague will have a different opinion while a junior depending on his experience will have his own opinion. If my career was helped by my colonel, I'll put him next to Napoleon and if his report ruined my career, his personal shortcomings will be communicated to everyone even if he was a fine officer. (For an outsider this is the most difficult task to separate personal issues from professional ones).

In a peacetime army words like 'good officer', 'standing in the army', 'competent' are all subjective. In nut shell, most officers running for third star are average with sprinkling of few brighter ones and an odd ball who is judged by peers not worthy of the amount of brass on his shoulder. Serving officers are careful and usually keep quite on the issue. Retired ones are more open and some of the opinions are not printable. We are not interested in their personal and professional quarrels but want to focus on the issue which has long term effects on the institution.

Now lets deal with specifics of three of your course mates. When I was pointing out about chances of Asif Akhtar it was in no way deragotary. I gave opinion of one person and it is good that you gave the other side. I was not suggesting that he needed more exposure. I was just merely pointing to the fact how Pakistan army normally handles this issue. It is for everyone to discuss its merits and deficiencies. Mohsin Kamal case is different. He was already a corps commander. He was just moved to another post. Changing a Corp commander within a year is odd. The reason was that Kiyani took control of army in unusual circusmtances and could not bring his own team immediately which is a norm in every army. In my view, General Mussharraf tried to overplay his hand and made key changes just before giving baton to Kiyani. He may have his own complusions but it was very bad for the institution. It was a loose loose situation both for Mussharraf, Kiyani and officers concerned (in my view, another very good officer, Lt. General Sajjad Akram was another casualty of these unusual circumstances.) In my view, Kiyani did his best and in appropriate way. Now come to Nusrat Naeem case. We do not have his side of the story which will be helpful and fair to the officer. We can not pass a judgement without hearing the defence. I hope every one is familiar with the incident. Every serving and retired officer was outraged and disgusted. In nut shull, if he himself gave the order then the opinion of almost everyone is that he should have been asked to put up his papers. If he was unaware and subordinates acted on their own what are current army rules (some of which are in my view absurd) which are applied every day to lesser mortals. If a soldier looses his weapon what happens to CO? When a unit vehicle gets into a small accident, why sometimes CO does not report it and have it fixed through his own personal or unit's fund? I'm sure all of you know the reasons and in this lies the answer to our question. If overzealous subordinates acted in the manner they did without orders then it is indictement of the whole insitution and Naeem is no more important. What are the rules governing this type of excercise?

As far as 'straight' and 'upright' issue, this is very subjective and there are many views. Trust me on this that in view of dozens of officers at major and colonel level every officer who reaches the two star rank fits the dictionary definition of 'sycophant'. He gets both his brain and balls back when he sheds his uniform. This was the summary of the view which I got especially after the recent mumblings of Lt. General Jamshed Kiyani and Shahid Aziz. Every superceded officer thinks that he was the most upright officer ever produced by the army. During Islamic times of late General Zia ul Haq, the line was 'I was supercded because I was not a hypocrite. I used to drink and Zia wanted to promote Maulvis'. In the times of 'enligtened moderation' the line was 'I'm a good Muslim and don't drink therefore I was not considered for promotion'. Go figure it out.

Every army and Pakistan army is no exception promotes officers to senior ranks who conform to institutional ethos. Current system does not encourage innovation and initiative therefore the product at top is an average lot. In my humble view by weeding out officers who have the moral courage to openly ask professional questions at Major & Colonel levels have done a great harm to the institution. No army had profited from destroying war diaries and running peacetime 'rigged' excercises to get good chits to climb the pormotion ladder. A junior off course salutes a senior because of the brass on his shoulder but the brass does not earn him respect. To earn genuine respect, we need different qualities among senior ranks. At two and three star, these officers are so isolated from reality that they completely rely on reports generated from below. Everyone wants to be on the right side. They first want to know the opinion of the senior and then give answer which fits the senior's view.

There are many especially at mid ranks who have the moral courage (I know a few such good men which any army can be proud of) and they are the jewel of the army. It will help the institution if such flowers are allowed to flourish. When General Mushharraf visited Bahawalpur garrison, there was question & answer session. One Colonel stood up asked a question about Kargil asking him how could senior brass could embark on a course not taking into consideration some basic rules which are taught at company commander level. The audience rather than appreciating the frankness were shocked and there was a unanimous opinion that the career of this colonel is finished. It should not be like that. Similarly, at NDC after much wrangling it was finally decided to have a staged analysis of Kargil for Brigadier and up level. When serious questions were asked by audience, session was abrupty cut short with a comment by the NDC chief that 'I'll done a black cloak and everyone can then start throwing stones at me'. Is this the way to train senior officers? Siachin was lost. Corps Commander who had just handed over the charge before the incident became governor. Corps Commander under whose watch this happened was actually considered for VCOAS post and was later given the consolation prize of chairman of a private corporation. Two star FCNA who was directly incharge got his third star. It is upto Pakistan army to decide is this the way forward to build a professional army? (has anybody heard about Iraq recently? What happened? A group of morally upright and intelligent batch of colonels has turned the tide. To the senior U.S. brass credit, they allowed the dissenters way down the food chain to take charge as it was considered good for the army and the country. More on this little publicized but an important event of modern U.S. military history later. In this may be a lesson for Pakistan army facing some challenging times in FATA.)

'jheel ankhon ko, na hoonton ko kanwal kehte hein
hum to zakhmoon ki namaish ko ghazal kehte hein'.

Kind and Warm Regards,

Hamid

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HAMID HUSSAINS ORIGINAL ARTICLE ON PAKISTANI ARMY PROMOTIONS


October 31, 2008

Dear All;

About a month ago, when Pakistan army senior officer promotions were in pipeline, I shared my perspective with few. I didn't share it widely as I thought it will generate unnecessary rumors and in view of conspiracy ridden world view of many will not help in a meaningful and informed debate. Now that promotions are done (I was close to 95% mark and have won some bets), I think following piece may interest you. The bold in parenthesis are postscript.

Regards,
Hamid
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Wheel of Fortune – Coming Senior Officer Promotions in Pakistan Army
Hamid Hussain



In the next few days, a major shuffle is due in Pakistan army. General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani has already made his decision about the promotions and transfers before embarking on a trip to China. He is keeping all his cards in the inner pocket. Let's try to peek into the coming changes and decipher some signs. It is important to understand these changes as this new set up will be making important decisions for the next few years. These changes will also have an impact on how Pakistan army is going to recalibrate its course.



In case of Pakistan, army chief decides about the promotions and transfers of his senior officers. In this exercise, he carefully balances several factors, however at the end of the day, he is the decider. He can pull some rabbits from the hat at the last minute, however such surprises are rare. First of all let's clear the deck of candidates who are not unlikely to get promoted (less than five percent chance of promotion). This list includes few senior Major Generals. Major General Nusrat Naeem is an artillery officer who is on his way out from Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. He is close to former army Chief General Pervez Mussharraf and was involved in a scandal two years ago when ISI roughened a senior decorated officer after a petty fight among progeny of the mighty. This caused utter disgust among officers of all ranks. He is currently in transit giving away charge of his post at ISI. Major General Asif Akhtar is from infantry and currently a director at ISI. Someone who knows him well commented that he was surprised even when Akhtar was promoted Major General. Usually if a two star serving at ISI is considered for promotion, he is brought out to daylight a while before promotion. This helps in getting off some dust collected during the stint in shadows. Several of Akhtar's colleagues have already attained third star more than a year ago. He will likely retire in coming days. Major General Muhammad Akram Sahi is currently commandant of Infantry School at Quetta. He served as General Officer Commanding (GOC) of a division operating in turbulent tribal areas and during that tenure was criticized for many ill thought actions. On his farewell dinner, Sahi boasted that he has established the writ of government in Waziristan. Some junior officers challenged him that he will be unable to go in his official car from Miranshah to Tank even with full escort. Usually, an officer who has lost confidence of his juniors is not considered for higher rank as he will not be very effective. In addition, Infantry School of Quetta is usually the final destination of an officer who is on his way out. (None of them got promoted)



The list of officers with very good chance of getting the third star (more than ninety percent) include few senior Major Generals and may be some lucky ones down the ladder. Current Director General Military Operations (DGMO) Major General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Commandant of Military Academy Major General Zahid Hussain, GOC of Special Service Group (SSG) Major General Tahir Mahmood and Major General Khalid Mustafa Khan of armored corps are front runners. (All got third star) Major General Muhammad Siddique of Air Defense and Major General Asif Ali of Engineers may get their third star due to the 'quota' of their service. Usually two or three Lieutenant Generals are from non-fighting arms such as Engineers, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME), Air Defense, Ordnance and Supply Corps. The fate of Major General Masood Hassan and Khalid Amir Jaffry is in balance and they can go either way, although I'll put them in the unlikely category. (Both of them didn't get promotion)





The post of Inspector General of Frontier Corps (IGFC) of N.W.F.P. was the backwaters of Pakistan army as far as Major General rank was concerned. Conflict in tribal areas has put this post in limelight. This post has become a furnace where those with wood in their legs get burned and usually go home. Those with a little bit of metal get out from the furnace a bit stronger and go ahead. The problem of tribal areas is quite complex and beyond the capacity of a single individual. Even the most capable officer will have significant limitations. This problem needs a more coordinated and institutional approach to contain the fire burning in tribal areas. Current IGFC Major General Muhammad Alam Khattak has a shot at third star but failure of peace deals with militants may go against his elevation. (looks like his fate is sealed and he is sent to an obscure post) Major General Tariq Masood who was IGFC from 2004-06 had a real difficult task on his hand but there were number of problems. I don't think that he will advance further. I think decision has been finalized about Major General Tariq Khan (Armored Corps) taking over FC (he became IGFC) , although in my view he may have been a good choice for DGMO post. One reason to pick Tariq was the fact that he had done a stint at CENTCOM headquarters at Tampa when he was Brigadier. In IGFC capacity, he will have some working relation with Americans across the Durand Line and thinking is that he may be able to handle things better. He is in transit to become IGFC and will continue to tackle militants wearing a different hat. He was commanding 14th Division operating in Waziristan and at least doused the fire to some extent. If he performs reasonably well, he is all set to rise further but opportunity also brings some risks. If he bungles big time, then his career may end sooner than expected. Several officers who have commanded troops battling in tribal areas have retired as Major Generals. The list includes Major General Taj-ul-Haq (IGFC from 2000-2004) and Major General Mir Haider Ali Khan. Major General Javed Sultan (GOC of Kohat based 9th Division) died with his boots on when his helicopter crashed in Waziristan. Major Generals Muhammad Akram Sahi (GOC of a division operating in Waziristan) and Tariq Masood (IGFC from 2004-06) will likely retire in the same rank. (they are now cooling their heals before hanging their boots)



It is very likely that when new team settles in, Kiyani will attempt to change the course albeit cautiously. We can not ignore the basic reality that majority of Pakistanis don't see us as friend or ally. They have great misgivings about us and majority of them see us as an adversary and every Pakistani leader has to take into consideration this fact. Situation on the ground is much worse than what appears on the surface. We also need to remember significant limitations of Pakistan army as they are operating against their own people. After all, if 82nd Airborne was operating in El Paso, it will not have the liberty to call in F-16 strikes to level the whole block. This fundamental difference between our own operational strategy and that of Pakistan need to be kept in mind all the time. There is tremendous pressure on Kiyani from below to change the course as far fight against militants is concerned. Majority of Pakistani generals want a shift to suit their own interests. This does not mean that they are oblivious to the threat from the extremists. After all, Pakistan army is now at the receiving end of the extremist guns. The difference is about the methodology of tackling the threat. They understand the need of use of force but are looking for ways to use it judiciously and as last resort. They want to try other remedies which they feel may help the ailment. We can try to pour our own concoction in their mouths by holding them down but such measures not only fail but also annoy the patient.



I have already noticed the signs that Kiyani is starting to close down some windows which have been open to us. Former army chief and President Pervez Mussharraf had compartmentalized some operations. Major General Nadeem Ejaz who is related to Mussharraf was Director General Military Intelligence (DGMI). He was handling some tricky areas such as allowing U.S. to operate inside Pakistan which in my view was a bad idea to start with. About some decisions, Mussharraf had kept others including ISI in the dark. When Kiyani took control of army, he brought in his own DGMI. Kiyani became aware of secret arrangement of allowing limited U.S. operations inside Pakistan when senior U.S. military officials briefed him. He was furious and gave green signal to the new civilian kid on the block Asif Ali Zardari to deliver coup de grace to Mussharraf and rest is history. He has already changed the senior and midlevel positions in MI and some midlevel positions in ISI. In the next few weeks he will bring new Director General of Inter Services Intelligence (DGISI). (This was a much debated issue and almost all thought that Kiyani will not change DGISI who has been at the post for less than a year. My point was that after revelation about some MI understandings with U.S. about which Kiyani was kept in dark even when he was DGISI meant that Kiyani could not trust anyone among the old guards let alone DGISI. In one sweep, he brought new DGISI and crucial X Corps Commander) This will finalize his firm control over the army. I think that strategically Pakistani general staff has concluded that they need to unhinge Pakistan army from U.S which looking at the long view may not be a bad idea. It is not likely that they will simply pack up and leave large swaths of territory to militants. They will curtail visible contacts with U.S. military and try to work their own model in tribal areas ignoring our advice. They will be engaged with us but their line will be that simply give us the money and tools and let us do it our way. Whether we will be happy with this arrangement or not is another matter. Frustration on all sides is of monumental proportions and it is the responsibility of all players to bring back sanity in the room.



The ground reality has distorted to a point where if we don't give some room to breath to Pakistan's civilian and military leaders, the extremist amongst their midst are willing to incinerate them. They have successfully targeted former Prime Minister, a serving Lieutenant General and several prominent military installations. Our goal should be now to focus on preserving intelligence cooperation which has paid rich dividends. If we insist on thrusting our 'advisors' and 'trainers' in Kiyani's face, he may get startled. Like any army, with few exceptions, Pakistani generals are not known for their strategic farsightedness. In a knee jerk reaction they may curtail intelligence cooperation or worse may embark on some reckless course of directing their fire across Durand Line. Taking pot shots at our troops or helicopters gives them cheap popularity at home and they may decide to shore up their sinking stock by going 'anti-American' at least in public. On a parallel track, Pakistan army is now trying to cultivate NATO and especially British military and intelligence personnel in an attempt to decrease pressure from Washington. They will try to use the differences between U.S. and NATO to their own advantage which should not surprise us. A more cooperative rather than antagonistic approach is in the interest of all parties.



To be fair, many mistakes and blunders which we made in Afghanistan can not be put at Pakistan army's doorstep. There is not much clarity of thought as far Washington is concerned. We now seriously need an end game plan for the region. Simply bombing every gun totting gathering and stumbling from one crisis to another is not a strategy. It will be naïve to expect that Pakistan should underwrite Afghanistan's security without securing its own interests in Afghanistan or seriously compromising its own security. Many mid-level Pakistani officers who usually have a better military sense were correct in their analysis (This is based on my personal interaction with many of them). As early as September 2001, long before first American landed in Afghanistan, Brigadiers at Pakistan's Military Operations Directorate cautioned that Pushtun areas should be handled with care. They warned that if Pushtun areas are handled carelessly either by Americans or Pakistanis then war in tribal areas will become Pakistan's 'own war'. All parties made mistakes and the way forward is to maintain a working relationship fully appreciating differences. We need to keep open channel with senior Pakistani officers despite their constant bickering. We can act as a middleman to try to patch up differences between Pakistan and Afghanistan with full understanding that we can not solve their problems. People of the region and their leaders will find the solution of their problems even if we don't like it or approve it. They have to live together long after we are gone. A stable and peaceful region is in everybody's interest and we should work constructively with all players. Clash between trio of Pakistan, Afghanistan and U.S. will be a gift to militants. Every loss of state actors is an automatic gain for non-state actors. The beauty of this equation is that they don't even have to earn it. They simply get it by default.



Pakistan has a new and a bit shaky civilian set up. We all know that the fountain of power is Pakistan army and all strategic decisions are subject to veto by General Head Quarters (GHQ). Giving some room to Kiyani to maneuver may be better in our long term interest. This will help him to decrease pressure from below. Intelligence cooperation can be then expanded to compensate for retreat from other areas. It is far better to have intelligence links than having few Marines training FC personnel. We should focus on goals and objectives and be flexible with methodology. If visits by high profile military officials every two weeks are helpful then it should be done but if it is proving counterproductive then we should pause and think through. In my opinion, such fanfare is counterproductive. A quieter approach and focus on serious business will help both Pakistan and U.S. A robust mid and lower level close cooperation between U.S. and Pakistanis focusing on extremist threats will pay dividends over the long run. Off course, some arm twisting of a reluctant ally will be needed from time to time. However, there is a difference between gentle prodding and arm twisting to sticking one's boot into the other party's behind. Our lack of understanding of thought process and working of Pakistani general staff is hampering our efforts on several fronts. Every conflict is unique and constant change on the ground demands a flexible stance where more suave approach and finesse pays more dividends than bravado. The threat to established order is from extremists and states need to cooperate to counter this threat despite their differences. This is the real challenge for the civilian and military leadership of every country.



Dr. Hamid Hussain is an independent analyst based in New York.



Hamid Hussain

New York

September 25, 2008